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Abstract 
This article argues that revolutionary leaders are more willing to commit mass 
killing than nonrevolutionary leaders. Revolutionary leaders are more ideolog-
ically committed to transforming society, more risk tolerant, and more likely to 
view the use of violence as appropriate and effective. Furthermore, such leaders 
tend to command highly disciplined and loyal organizations, built in the course 
of revolutionary struggles, that can perpetrate mass killing. This study uses time 
series cross-sectional data from 1955 to 2004 to demonstrate that revolutionary 
leaders are more likely to initiate genocide or politicide than nonrevolutionary 
leaders. The violent behaviors of revolutionary leaders are not limited to the im-
mediate postrevolutionary years but also occur later in their tenure. This demon-
strates that the association of revolutionary leaders and mass killing is not sim-
ply indicative of postrevolutionary instability. This article also provides evidence 
for the importance of exclusionary ideologies in motivating revolutionary lead-
ers to inflict massive violence. 
Keywords: human rights, domestic politics, political leadership, political survival  
This article examines the relationship between revolutionary leaders and mass 
killing. Previous studies have focused how the aftermath of domestic revolu-
tions opens up opportunities for new elites to seize control of the state (e.g., Fein 
1993; Krain 1997; Melson 1992). Mass violence is considered to be a product of 
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the political upheaval that occurs during and shortly after a revolution. How-
ever, revolution not only produces the collapse of a state’s political authority 
and heightened political instability but also elevates a type of leaders qualita-
tively different from the type that comes into power through other means. The 
questions of how different revolutionary leaders are from others and whether 
revolutionary leaders are more prone to employ mass violence than their non-
revolutionary counterparts have not received much systematic investigation 
in the political violence literature. This article attempts to determine whether 
revolutionary leaders have an impact on the likelihood of mass killing onsets 
distinct from revolutions as one-off events. 
I argue that not only are leaders emerging from domestic revolutionary strug-
gles apt to possess an enhanced willingness to engage in large-scale violence, 
but they are also likely to command highly disciplined and loyal organizations 
for doing so. Revolutionary leaders are, on average, more ideologically commit-
ted to a radical transformation of the existing social and political orders, more 
risk tolerant, and less violence averse than their nonrevolutionary counterparts. 
These personal attributes lower their perceived moral, political, and economic 
costs of inflicting large-scale violence on civilians and raise their perceived ben-
efits of mass murders. Revolutionary leaders, thus, are more likely to have the 
‘‘destroy them to save us’’ mentality (Semelin 2013, 48). Moreover, such leaders 
often develop a strong, cohesive, and loyal organization during their sustained 
armed struggles against state authorities. They can then deploy these appara-
tuses against groups the leaders perceive as oppositional. 
To assess the effects of revolutionary leaders on mass killing, I conduct a se-
ries of statistical tests using the cross-national data set of revolutions and rev-
olutionary leaders developed by Colgan (2012). Three main findings stand out. 
First, I find that revolutionary leaders are more likely than other types of lead-
ers to commit mass atrocities. In contrast, leaders who seize power through ex-
tra-constitutional means other than revolutions do not significantly correlate 
with a greater risk of mass killing. These results confirm the distinct nature of 
revolutions that seek a rapid and radical transformation of society. 
Second, I demonstrate that the association of revolutionary leaders and mass 
killing is not simply indicative of postrevolutionary instability. I find that a 
heightened risk of genocide or politicide is associated with not only the imme-
diate period following the revolution but also the postrevolutionary period when 
revolutionary leaders have been in power for ten to twenty-five years. These 
results indicate that the violent behaviors of revolutionary leaders are not en-
tirely attributable to the political turmoil surrounding revolutions but are also 
a factor of the leaders’ personal attributes. Last, my analysis confirms the im-
portance of exclusionary ideologies, as data show that only revolutionary lead-
ers espousing exclusionary ideologies are significantly associated with a greater 
risk of mass killing. 
This article relates to several distinct lines of research. First, this article con-
tributes to the growing body of research on mass killing by presenting new ev-
idence for the effects of revolutions and revolutionary leaders on mass killing 
onsets. Surprisingly, no quantitative studies I know of have directly examined 
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the relationship between revolutions and mass killing, although scholars have 
long considered revolutions an important factor in prompting leaders to per-
petrate mass killing. For instance, Krain (1997) uses a measure of ‘‘extra-con-
stitutional change’’ defined as ‘‘forced changes in the top government elite and/
or its effective control of the nation’s power structure in a given year.’’ Revolu-
tions are too distinctive to be lumped with other extra-constitutional changes 
in government, such as coups and rebellions, that make no effort to transform 
existing social and political orders. Harff’s (2003) seminal study uses state-fail-
ure years, including revolutionary wars and adverse regime changes, as the 
unit of analysis rather than directly investigating the effect of revolutions on 
mass killing. This is in marked contrast with the accumulation of many empir-
ical studies reporting the relationship between armed conflict and mass killing 
(e.g., Anderton and Carter 2015; Harff 2003; Krain 1997; Valentino, Huth, and 
Balch-Lindsay 2004; Wayman and Tago 2010). 
Similarly, despite the increasing emphasis on individual leaders’ ideals and 
strategic motivations, existing scholarship has also failed to examine the cross-
national correlation between individual leaders and mass violence. This article 
is an attempt to fill that gap by providing rare cross-national evidence show-
ing the importance of individual leaders in explaining mass violence. Accord-
ingly, it complements the significant qualitative studies on leaders and their 
ideologies (e.g., Bellamy 2012; Mann 2005; Midlarsky 2011; Straus 2015; Val-
entino 2004; Weitz 2003). 
Third, the findings of this study add to the literature on revolutionary re-
gimes and leaders. Revolutionary governments are found to be more likely to de-
ploy and use military force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives (Colgan 2013; 
Gurr 1988) as well as to possess superior war-making capabilities and perform 
more successfully in interstate wars (Carter, Bernhard, and Palmer 2012). This 
study shows that they also have a higher willingness and capacity for using vi-
olence against their citizens. Lastly, the results reported in this article add to 
the growing evidence that individual leaders’ personal attributes affect states’ 
policies (Colgan 2013; Horowitz and Stam 2014; Kennedy 2011) 
Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killings 
Before discussing the relationship between revolutionary leaders and mass kill-
ing onsets, I first define what I mean by revolutionary leaders and mass killing. 
I follow Colgan’s (2013) definition of revolutionary leaders: ‘‘individuals who per-
sonally helped transform the existing social, political, and economic relation-
ships of the state by overthrowing or rejecting the principal existing institutions 
of society’’ (p. 658). This definition does not make violence an essential attribute 
of revolution, which is important to the research question this article asks. Non-
violent overthrow of communist regimes in Eastern Europe can be included in 
the concept of revolution. Meanwhile, revolutions are distinguishable from vi-
olent leadership turnovers, including coups, rebellions, and civil wars, which 
just rearrange the administrative apparatus or replace old elite with new elite 
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without transforming social or economic structures and practices (Walt 1992, 
324). On the other hand, mass killing refers to ‘‘large-scale, sustained, inten-
tional, systematic violence of state agents against civilians that results in mass 
deaths’’ (Kydd and Straus 2013, 2). The essential attribute of mass killing is its 
intentionality in the sense that the state makes a concerted attempt to kill its 
own civilians on a large scale. In this article, I use interchangeably the terms 
‘‘mass killing,’’ ‘‘mass atrocities,’’ and ‘‘mass murder.’’ 
The current literature on mass killing emphasizes leaders’ ideals and strat-
egies rather than preexisting prejudices and deep divisions in the population 
(Straus 2007, 2015). Many scholars argue that massive violence against civil-
ians, like other types of state repression, is the result of leaders’ purposeful 
and strategic policies aimed at strengthening their hold on power and achiev-
ing their policy goals, albeit at an extraordinarily high cost in death and de-
struction (Colaresi and Carey 2008; Mann 2005; Midlarsky 2011; Straus 2015; 
Valentino 2004; Weitz 2003). This emphasis on leaders is in line with increas-
ing tendencies to put leaders at the center of the analysis of foreign policies. 
Several scholars show that the beliefs and experience that leaders acquire be-
fore attaining office influence their foreign policy decisions (Colgan 2013; Ken-
nedy 2011; Horowitz and Stam 2014). I follow this leader-centered approach 
in discussing the relationship between revolutionary leaders and mass killing. 
What is it about revolutionary leaders that contributes to the risk of state-
sponsored mass killing? My argument runs as follows: a leader’s choices are 
determined by his or her subjective beliefs about the consequences of different 
choices. Revolutions select for a certain type of leaders; such leaders tend to 
have strong ideological commitments, be less risk averse, and possess previous 
experiences using violence successfully. Additionally, revolutionary leaders of-
ten command cohesive, high-disciplined, and loyal organizations that are able 
to commit large-scale atrocities. These characteristics raise their perceived ben-
efits of using mass killings while lowering their perceived costs. Then, the room 
for bargaining and compromise between the revolutionary government and po-
litical opponents significantly shrinks, increasing the likelihood that revolution-
ary leaders will choose mass killing. 
Revolutionary Leaders’ Greater Willingness to Engage in Mass Killing 
First, most revolutions tend to bring to power visionaries who tend to be ideolog-
ically or religiously driven and are determined to remake fundamentally their 
societies and states (Skocpol 1979; Stedman 1991; Walt 1992; Weitz 2003). Rev-
olutionary leaders are likely to have antagonistic views of the status quo and to 
believe that their achievements represent a fundamental break from the past, 
regardless of what they seek to achieve. Such leaders pursue transformative 
goals while in power and harness the state to the task of implementing pro-
grams of radical social transformation (Bellamy 2012; Weitz 2003). The radical 
transformation of society produces large dissatisfied groups whom leaders may 
view as a serious threat to their goals (Harff and Gurr 1989; Valentino 2004). 
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Revolutionary leaders’ ideologies can motivate, legitimate, and rational-
ize the use of mass atrocities against these groups by affecting how leaders 
perceive crises and define their goals (Bellamy 2012; Chirot and McCauley 
2010; Harff and Gurr 1989; Leader Maynard 2014; Mann 2005; Melson 1992; 
Straus 2015; Valentino 2004; Weitz 2003). Ideological frameworks, often artic-
ulated by revolutionary leaders, both define new goals for the state and iden-
tify groups inimical to that goals. The new revolutionary government may dis-
pense revolutionary justice to regime opponents and scapegoat them for social 
problems (Melson 1992; Weitz 2003; Walt 1992). For instance, the Bolsheviks 
categorized the Kulak, wealthy peasants, as the ‘‘enemy of the people’’ and at-
tempted to destroy it as a class (Melson 1992; Weitz 2003). Extreme violence 
against political opponents is often easily justified by framing these victims 
as excluded from what Fein (1993) terms the ‘‘universe of obligation.’’1 Rev-
olutionary leaders, ideologically and philosophically committed to their pro-
grams, ‘‘display an incredible indifference to costs in order to achieve their 
ideological goals’’ (Stedman 1991, 12). 
Moreover, opponents from within and outside the revolutionary regime can 
launch counterrevolutionary resistance movements against radical attempts to 
transform the society, when the regime is expected to threaten existing inter-
ests. Under these circumstances, the fear of reversion to an earlier subordinate 
period may help a revolutionary leader rationalize mass killing to ensure the 
survival of the movement (Midlarsky 2011). Mass violence not only crushes op-
ponents in the short run but also preempts their ability to mount a long-term 
challenge as well as to crush (Straus 2015). For example, Nuon Chea, the sec-
ond in command to Pol Pot in the Khmer Rouge regime, told an interviewer: 
‘‘Our project was to transform the nature of society … Ours was a clean regime 
… That was our aim, but we failed because the enemy’s spies attacked and sab-
otaged us from the start’’ (as cited in Straus 2015; Lemkin and Sambath 2009, 
13:15–14:10). Clearly, fear that the revolutionary regime’s achievements could 
be erased provided the rationale for the genocide in Cambodia. Robespierre, Sta-
lin, and the young Turks also exemplify revolutionary leaders who were par-
anoid about the survival of their revolutions. The killings committed by com-
munist regimes such as the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia, referred to as 
‘‘revolutionary mass murder’’ (Harff and Gurr 1989, 29) or ‘‘dispossessive mass 
killing’’ (Valentino 2004, 71), illustrate the type of mass killings prompted by 
this rationale. 
Second, successful revolutionary leaders are, on average, more risk tolerant 
than nonrevolutionary leaders. Highly risk-averse individuals are unlikely to 
start a revolution and succeed as revolutionaries, since engaging in revolution-
ary activity is an extremely risk-tolerant choice (Colgan 2013, 662; Horowitz 
and Stam 2014, 536).2 As Walt (1992, 334) writes, ‘‘[s]uccessful revolutions are 
rare, because even weak and corrupt states usually control far greater resources 
than do their internal opponents. … Indeed, it is perhaps more surprising that 
any ever succeed.’’ Even after seizing power, revolutionary leaders need to de-
feat other rivals and counterrevolutionary movements in order to consolidate 
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power. Therefore, low risk aversion is a critical factor for successful revolu-
tionary leaders, which implies that individuals who self-select into leadership 
positions in rebel groups are less risk averse.3 Those who are more risk toler-
ant tend to attach higher utility to risky gambles and are more likely to over-
estimate the probability of gains and underestimate the probability of losses 
(Schneider and Lopes 1986). More risk-tolerant leaders are better able to suc-
ceed by taking advantage of political opportunities presented whereas highly 
risk-averse leaders limit their chances of success by not taking advantage of 
opportunities they could have exploited. Additionally, leaders who have previ-
ously experienced greater levels of risk and success are more likely to engage in 
high-risk behavior (Xue et al. 2010). Revolutionary leaders thus are more will-
ing to take another high-risk gamble, the mass murder of civilians, than non-
revolutionary leaders. 
Last, having prior successes as rebels can make revolutionary leaders pre-
disposed to believe in the efficacy of violence as a strategy (Horowitz and Stam 
2014, 537).4 Revolutionary leaders often come to power through violence and 
face armed counterrevolutionary movements (Levitsky and Way 2013). These 
armed struggles produce leaders with successful experience in sustained vio-
lence. An individual’s prior experiences serve as a heuristic to evaluate that 
person’s choices (Jervis 1976). For example, leaders of the Bolshevik revolu-
tion, having experienced civil wars, did not hesitate to exercise state violence 
after seizing power (Weitz 2003). Similarly, Mao’s prior experiences with in-
ternal and external conflicts, and his successes as a rebel leader, made him in-
clined to think that the use of violence would be an effective means to achieve 
his goals (Kennedy 2011). Consistent with this argument, Horowitz and Stam 
(2014) find that those leaders who come to power with prior rebel experience 
are more likely to initiate militarized disputes than leaders lacking any rebel 
experience. Using similar reasoning, Gurr (1988) argues that leaders who have 
secured and retained power through the use of violence are disposed to respond 
violently to future challenges. 
Revolutionary Leaders’ Greater Organizational Capacity for Mass Killing 
Not only will revolutionary leaders be more willing to engage in mass killings, 
but they will also have at their disposal highly disciplined organizations that 
can commit large-scale campaigns of violence (Carter, Bernhard and Palmer 
2012; Gurr 1988; Krain 2000; Levitsky and Way 2013). As Straus (2015, 76) em-
phasizes, mass violence requires the capacity to coordinate perpetrators, iden-
tify and access target civilian populations, and systematically inflict violence 
across time and territory. Many revolutionary leaders engage in violent con-
flict to overthrow the incumbent government and to defeat counterrevolution-
ary movements after seizing power. Levitsky and Way (2013, 12) argue that 
this period of sustained armed struggle provides revolutionary leaders with ex-
perience both in using violence as an instrument of change and control and in 
organizing effectively through, for example, strong ruling parties or expanded 
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security forces. Revolutionary leaders can use those same skills to commit ci-
vilian atrocities and to engage a coercive apparatus established during revolu-
tionary movements as it continues to operate afterward. 
Furthermore, the army and other security forces are ideologically disciplined 
and loyal to the regime, since they are either reconstructed by a radical purge 
or built from scratch after the revolutionary interregnum (Levitsky and Way 
2013, 11). A revolutionary ideology may serve to mobilize perpetrators, provid-
ing them with ideological motivations and legitimations for perpetrating mass 
murders (Leader Maynard 2014). The close ties between the communist party 
and the military in Cuba, Vietnam, and China, or between the Khomeini re-
gime and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, illustrate this point. This implies that 
revolutionary leaders are more likely to be united behind high-intensity re-
pression and are less vulnerable to internal disobedience, emphasized in De-
Meritt (2015). Furthermore, revolutionary leaders are thus less troubled by the 
dilemma faced by most autocrats that the repressive apparatus necessary to 
counter threats from those excluded from power can also be turned against the 
autocrats themselves (see Svolik 2012). 
Hypotheses 
When deciding whether to pursue systematic large-scale campaigns of violence, 
leaders must weigh the expected costs of committing mass killing against both 
the perceived probability of success and the anticipated benefits of escalating 
violence. That mass violence against domestic civilians is typically deliberate 
and instrumental does not mean that it comes at a low price. To the contrary, 
mass killing is extremely costly and risky. First, targeting large numbers of 
civilians causes immense moral opprobrium and increases opposition to the 
government. Second, a government will face international condemnation and 
sometimes punitive actions, such as economic sanctions and military interven-
tions, for perpetrating the mass murder of civilians (Straus 2015, 49). In addi-
tion, leaders ordering mass killings always face the possibility that agents re-
sponsible for perpetrating the killing may refuse to follow orders—due either 
to moral constraints or to the fear of international prosecution or other forms 
of public retribution (DeMeritt 2015; Levitsky and Way 2013). As the exam-
ples of Serbia in 2000, Ukraine in 2004, and Egypt and Tunisia in 2011 show, 
internal disobedience undermines the government’s coercive monopoly and ca-
pacity to engage in outright repression and can even contribute to regime col-
lapse (Levitsky and Way 2013, 12). Fourth, in situations of armed conflict, mass 
killing can backfire because it can trigger revenge or divert scarce resources 
away from military campaigns against an opposing military (Straus 2015, 49). 
A policy of mass killing can also cause the incumbent to lose political support 
in the long run even if it is effective as a strategy of counterinsurgency (Val-
entino 2004, 68). Last, mass killings incur economic costs for leaders (Straus 
2015, 50). Mass killing entails the destruction of physical infrastructure and hu-
man capital, creating huge refugee outflows. This large-scale disruption to the 
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economy can hurt growth potentials and revenue streams to the state. When 
leaders perceive these costs of escalating violence to be too high and the prob-
ability of success to be low, they will seek alternative policies. 
However, because of their characteristics described above, revolutionary lead-
ers are less likely to be restrained from employing mass violence by these costs. 
Under such a postrevolution regime, the room for bargaining and compromise 
between the revolutionary government and political opponents is significantly 
reduced. This is particularly true when the new revolutionary regime’s efforts 
to implement radical change threaten to challenge existing societal interests 
and institutions and when the new leaders perceive political opponents as in-
herently dangerous for whatever reason. Regime opponents will prefer ongoing 
resistance and fighting as hard as they can to ending the conflict by cutting a 
deal. These violent resistances engender more threats to the revolutionary gov-
ernment and confirm the revolutionary leaders’ perception of their opponents as 
a threat to their goals. When the ruling elites believe that the opponents can-
not be persuaded to change their behavior, the perceived benefits of destroy-
ing them increases (Straus 2015). All of this incentivize revolutionary leaders 
to choose mass killing as a preemptive measure of self-protection. Hence, I ar-
gue that revolutionary leaders will be, on average, more likely to commit mass 
killing than nonrevolutionary leaders. 
This holds true in comparison to other nonrevolutionary leaders, such as 
coup leaders, who come to power via nonconstitutional means. Coup leaders, 
often from the military or other elites within the state, rarely engage in sus-
tained armed struggles during a coup attempt. Only a handful of men managed 
to overthrow the existing government as in Libya 1969 and in Ghana 1981. Mil-
itary officers tend to avoid escalation into a fratricidal conflict that might dam-
age the military’s corporate interests and spiral into civil war (Singh 2014). 
This is why many coups tend to be bloodless and short. Moreover, coup leaders 
and perpetrators tend to be less driven by ideological goals and are less likely 
to seek a radical transformation of society. Hence, they will have a smaller in-
centive to commit large-scale campaigns of violence against civilians than do 
revolutionary leaders, and they cannot expect their subordinates to follow an 
order to massacre the opposition’s military men and civilians. 
However, not every revolutionary leader commits mass killing. A certain 
type of revolutionary leader may be both more willing to engage in genocide and 
politicide and more capable of doing so. Some revolutions, such as the ‘‘color’’ 
revolutions in the former Soviet republics, took place peacefully. If rebel expe-
rience in violent movements is important to leaders’ willingness to use extreme 
violence against civilians, leaders of violent revolutions will be more prone to 
governmentsponsored mass killing than leaders of nonviolent revolutions. I 
thus differentiate between violent and nonviolent revolutions. 
Second, an exclusionary ideology, defined as a belief system ‘‘that iden-
tifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, 
persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people’’ (Harff 2003, 63), will be 
particularly important in motivating mass atrocities. Leaders committed to 
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exclusionary ideologies may perceive the aforementioned costs of mass killing 
to be worth paying in order to remove threats to both their survival and their 
political goals. Such leaders may also overestimate the likelihood of success 
and the ensuing benefits of mass killing. Supporting this claim, Harff shows 
that where the ruling elites advocate an exclusionary ideology, countries are 
more likely to have state failures leading to genocide or politicide than those 
with no such ideology. Additionally, Straus’s (2015) analysis of sub-Saharan 
countries shows that where political elites articulate ideologies construct-
ing the primary identity-based group and excluding certain groups (such as 
Rwanda and Sudan), severe crisis is most likely to escalate to genocide. On the 
other hand, where elites embraced pluralism and inclusiveness (such as the 
Ivory Coast, Mali, and Senegal), similar crises do not. This discussion leads 
to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:  Revolutionary leaders are more likely to execute mass kill-
ing than nonrevolutionary leaders, including those who seize 
power via violent means. 
Hypothesis 1a:  Leaders of violent revolutions are more likely to execute mass 
killing than leaders of nonviolent revolutions. 
Hypothesis 1b:  Revolutionary leaders who espouse exclusionary ideologies 
are more likely to initiate mass killing than revolutionary 
leaders who do not. 
Political opportunities in the aftermath of a revolution might be solely re-
sponsible for the occurrence of mass killings perpetrated by revolutionary gov-
ernments (see Krain 1997; Melson 1992). The collapse of a state’s political au-
thority and heightened political instability following the revolution creates a 
precondition more conducive to the use of mass killing. The need for power con-
solidation may be strongest in the wake of the revolution since the new gov-
ernment’s survival is at risk. Figure 1 shows that about 40 percent of revolu-
tionary leaders were ousted within the first five years in office, although this 
percentage is much lower compared to nonrevolutionary leaders (about 70 per-
cent). The postrevolutionary situation may encourage revolutionary leaders to 
choose large-scale violence over other strategies. Mass murders committed by 
Idi Amin against Milton Obote’s (the former president) supporters in Uganda, 
and those by the Khomeini regime against Mujahedeen, Kurds and Baha’is, oc-
curred in the postrevolutionary period (Krain 2000). 
However, I argue that not only postrevolutionary situations but also revo-
lutionary leaders’ characteristics and organizational capacities contribute to 
the enhanced risk of mass killing. To the extent that revolutionary leaders’ 
characteristics and organizational capacities matter, a relationship between 
revolutionary leaders and mass killings should emerge after the end of the 
consolidation periods as well as during the consolidation periods. As Stalin’s 
collectivization campaign in the 1930s and Mao’s Cultural Revolution in the 
1960s illustrate, revolutionary leaders may be disappointed by the disparity 
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between the postrevolutionary order and their revolutionary ideals and seek to 
revive radicalism and to implement a new set of revolutionary measures (Gold-
stone 2014, 32). 
Hypothesis 2:  Revolutionary leaders are more likely to execute mass kill-
ing than nonrevolutionary leaders even after the period of 
power consolidation. 
Data and Method 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the onset of state-sponsored mass kill-
ing coded as 1 in the first year of a mass killing and 0 otherwise. I focused on 
mass killing onsets rather than mass killing incidence, paying particular at-
tention to conditions before the initiation of violence. This is because incidence 
reflects both the outbreak of new mass killing and the continuation of exist-
ing mass killing; thus, an estimated coefficient captures averages of the effect 
of a covariate on both the onset and the duration of mass killings.5 To examine 
the effect on onset, I excluded country-years with ongoing mass killing from 
the sample. 
To measure mass killing, I employed the widely used data set developed by 
the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), covering 1955 to 2012 (Marshall, 
Gurr, and Harff 2013).6 This data set follows the definitions and guidelines 
of Harff (2003) to identify and code episodes of genocide and politicide. Harff 
(2003) defines genocide and politicide as ‘‘the promotion, execution, and/ or im-
plied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents—or in 
Figure 1. Kaplan–Meier survival estimates by leader type. The sample includes 1,175 leader 
durations and 164 countries during the period of 1945 to 2004. Nondemocracies are regimes 
that have a Polity2 score of 6 or lower.  
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the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that result in the 
deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-commu-
nal group’’. This definition emphasizes the intentionality of the killing and the 
threats to the survival of certain groups. Genocides are mass killings in which 
the victims are defined by association with a particular communal group. Con-
trarily, politicides are mass killings in which victims are defined primarily in 
terms of their hierarchical position or political opposition to the regime and 
dominant groups (Harff 2003, 58). I did not differentiate between genocides 
and politicides in coding mass killing since revolutionary leaders’ personal at-
tributes and organizational capacities are expected to increase the risk of both 
genocides and politicides. 
Independent Variable 
The key independent variable is a binary indicator, Revolutionary Leader, for 
whether the state leader came to power by leading a revolution as coded in a 
data set developed by Colgan (2012).7 Revolutionary Leader equals 1 if the first 
generation of revolutionary leaders stay in power, and 0 otherwise.8 For the 
cases where multiple leaders have led a revolution, the leadership is limited to 
its senior leaders. As Colgan explains, for example, both Lenin and Stalin, se-
nior leaders of the Russian Revolution, are coded as Revolutionary Leaders, but 
Khrushchev, who fought in the Red Army as a young man, is not. 
To identify a revolution, Colgan (2012) uses two criteria: an irregular tran-
sition and radical domestic change. An irregular transition refers to a leader-
ship change that occurred through the use of armed force or widespread popu-
lar demonstrations that are either violent or nonviolent. The second criterion 
is that ‘‘the government must have implemented radical domestic changes for 
the purpose of transforming the organization of society, including its social, eco-
nomic, and political institutions and practices’’ (Colgan 2012, 453). To measure 
radical domestic changes, Colgan examines seven possible areas of change: (1) 
the selection and power of the national executive, (2) the structure of property 
ownership, (3) the relationship between state and religion, (4) the official polit-
ical ideology, (5) the official state name and symbols, (6) the institutionalized 
status of ethnicity and gender, and (7) the presence of a governing revolution-
ary council or committee. Colgan coded leaders as having implemented revolu-
tionary policy changes if there were dramatic changes in policy in at least three 
of the seven categories. 
This data set is useful for the analysis in this article for several reasons. I 
can identify revolutionary leaders as well as revolutions, which enables me to 
examine the effects of revolutionary leaders on mass killings as well as on rev-
olutions as events. In particular, revolutionary leaders are a strict subset of 
all leaders who come to power as a result of irregular transitions or the use of 
force. This allows me to test Hypothesis 1, comparing revolutionary leaders and 
nonrevolutionary leaders who come to power through irregular means, called 
Nonrevolutionary and Irregular Leader. Last, the data set considered violence 
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a nonessential factor when coding revolutions, which is important to the study 
of violence. 
To test additional hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), I disaggregate revo-
lutionary leaders. First, I distinguish between violent and nonviolent revolu-
tionary leaders. I coded a revolutionary leader as violent when the leader used 
armed force against his own state before and during the revolution and the rev-
olutionary process was violent. I coded other revolutionary leaders as nonvio-
lent. I rely on Colgan’s data set for the codings of the use of armed force and on 
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2014) and Svolik’s (2012) data sets for the cod-
ings of violent processes.9 Next, in order to test Hypothesis 1b, I similarly dif-
ferentiate revolutionary leaders with exclusionary ideologies from those with-
out exclusionary ideologies. To identify exclusionary ideologies, I rest on the 
measure created by Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr and updated by Monty Mar-
shall. The examples of exclusionary ideologies include strict variants of Marx-
ism–Leninism, rigid anticommunist doctrines, doctrines of ethnic and ethnon-
ationalist superiority or exclusivity, and states governed on the basis of Islamic 
Shari’a law that do not allow the expression of other religions (see Harff 2003, 
63, for detailed descriptions). 
In the sample of 162 countries from 1955 to 2004, there are eighty-five rev-
olutionary leaders and 839 country-years coded as revolutionary leaders.10 As 
Figure 2 illustrates, these observations account for 13 percent of 6,417 country-
years included in the baseline sample, which is slightly lower than the percent-
age of irregular nonrevolutionary leaders (17 percent). Almost every country-
year coded as revolutionary leaders scores lower than 7 on the Polity2 index. 
Moreover, 51 percent of revolutionary leaders are coded as espousing exclu-
sionary ideologies while 50 percent of revolutionary leaders are coded as hav-
ing gone through violent revolutions. 
Control Variables 
To control for potential confounding variables, I included a variety of control 
variables widely used in extant studies of mass killing. First, I controlled for 
two measures of internal and interstate armed conflict occurrences, taken from 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute, Oslo Armed Con-
flict Data set (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The most consistent finding in the empiri-
cal studies of mass killing is that governments are most likely to resort to mass 
killing when they are engaged in armed conflict (Harff 2003; Krain 1997). Ad-
ditionally, the fact that most revolutions are accompanied by violence suggests 
the importance of controlling for armed conflict. Among seventy-six revolutions 
identified by Colgan (2012), for example, thirty-six revolutions occurred in the 
midst of internal conflict (when armed conflict occurred in the current or pre-
vious year). International conflict could also confound the estimate on revolu-
tionary leaders. For example, Skocpol (1979) emphasizes the role of interna-
tional conflict in triggering the emergence of revolutions and Midlarsky (2011) 
finds that socioeconomic loss caused by defeat in war makes a country prone 
to political extremism and genocide. The indicators of internal and interstate 
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armed conflicts are coded as 1 for country-years with at least one correspond-
ing conflict occurring in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. 
Next, economic development could affect both revolutions and mass killing 
onsets. Low levels of economic development may be associated with a higher 
propensity toward revolutions, conflicts, and mass killings across countries. 
In a poor economy, the opportunity cost of participating in a conflict or revolu-
tion is small; thus, armed forces can be recruited cheaply (Collier and Hoeffler 
2004). Alternatively, underdeveloped countries tend to have weak state capac-
ities, lacking military, administrative, and bureaucratic infrastructures to ef-
fectively suppress insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Lastly, economic de-
velopment increases the likelihood and extent to which mass violence disrupts 
an economy (Straus 2015). The level of economic development is negatively as-
sociated with the risk of mass killing. Therefore, I controlled for per capita in-
come, obtained from Maddison (2003). 
Some researchers argue that regime type is an important determinant of 
mass atrocities (Colaresi and Carey 2008; Harff 2003; Rummel 1995). Demo-
cratic institutions present ex ante and ex post constraints on leaders’ decision-
making power and enable leaders to credibly commit to the promises they make 
in negotiations with opposition groups. Consistent with the literature on civil 
conflict, however, other studies (Anderton and Carter 2015) find that partial 
democracies, often called anocracies, are most at risk of mass killing. An anoc-
racy is a ‘‘regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features’’ (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003), characterized by weak institutions and governance. To capture a 
nonlinear effect of political regime, I include the Polity2 score (to which I add 
10 to make it strictly nonnegative), drawn from the Polity IV data set (Mar-
shall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013), and its squared term. Finally, according to the 
argument regarding political opportunities, it is political change and instabil-
ity, not regime type, that matter. Political instability opens the window of op-
portunity during which mass murders become more likely (Harff 2003; Krain 
Figure 2. Proportion of leader types.  
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1997). Thus, I introduced a measure of political instability, which equals 1 if 
the regime has a Polity IV Durable score of less than 3.11 
I also controlled for the following variables. The early scholars of geno-
cide studies (e.g., Kuper 1982) argue that preexisting deep social divisions 
are structural causes of genocide, although current scholars challenge this 
claim. I thus included a measure of the ethnic fractionalization of the coun-
try taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003). I also included a dummy variable 
for the post–Cold War period (post-1990) to capture potential changes in the 
dynamics of mass violence. The change in strategic interests of major powers, 
and heightened interest in human rights after the end of the Cold War, may 
increase the price of killing civilians (Anderton and Carter 2015). I included 
an indicator for nonrevolutionary governments that came to power through 
irregular means, which I referred to as nonrevolutionary/irregular leaders. 
This group of leaders satisfies only one of the two requirements of revolution-
ary leaders: an irregular transition into power. Last, to control for potential 
duration dependence, I included a cubic polynomial of the number of years 
since the last mass killing onset. 
Empirical Model 
To test the connection between revolutionary leaders and mass killing onset, I 
analyze a cross-national data set of 162 countries from 1955 to 2004. I consider 
all country-years during the period covered for those countries for which data 
exist. The unit of analysis is the country-year. I fit the following model, 
Pr(yit = 1|yit–1 = 0, Xit–1) = logit–1(βRit + Xit–1γ) 
where yit is a binary variable indicating whether a genocide or politicide oc-
curred in country i during year t. Rit is the variable of interest, and β describes 
the influence of revolutionary leaders on the probability of a mass killing onset. 
Xit–1 is a vector of control variables. One potential problem is that the outbreak 
of mass killing outbreak is a rare event, occurring in less than 1 percent of coun-
try-years in the sample used in main specification. To reduce rare events bias, I 
also estimate a rare events logit model (King and Zeng 2001) and Firth’s (1993) 
penalized likelihood logit model. The other challenge is to account for country-
level unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, I additionally present results from both 
random effect and fixed effects models.12 Given these estimation challenges, I 
consider and compare the results from several models. 
To ensure that the results are not simply an artifact of the decision to include 
all country-years, I pursued three additional strategies. First, I follow Colaresi 
and Carey (2008) in restricting the sample to country-years experiencing on-
going state failure (851 country-years). This strategy is based on the facts that 
most mass killings occurred during episodes of political upheaval and that con-
siderable heterogeneity exist among countries. The measure of state failure is 
obtained from the PITF (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2013).13 Of the 839 coun-
try-years coded as Revolutionary Leader, 211 (25 percent) are coded as having 
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experienced state failure. This proportion is similar to that in Nonrevolutionary 
and Irregular Leader (21 percent) but higher than that in Regular Leader (11 
percent). Second, I reestimated the main models with nondemocratic samples 
or irregular leader samples. Last, using a matching technique, I preprocessed 
the data to minimize any potential differences between the two groups before 
conducting the parametric analysis. Importantly, I obtained substantially sim-
ilar results across different samples. 
Results 
Revolutionary Leaders Are More Likely to Commit Mass Killing 
I begin with a descriptive examination of the relationship between revolution-
ary leaders and mass killing onset. To compare revolutionary leaders with other 
types of leaders, I distinguish among three types of leaders: (1) leaders who 
entered office through a regular process involving their country’s established 
norms, procedures, and institutions; (2) nonrevolutionary leaders who come to 
power in an irregular manner such as coups and insurrections; and (3) revo-
lutionary leaders. Figure 3 lists these three types of leaders and presents the 
rates of mass killing onset per year, averaged over all country-years (top) or 
state-failure years (bottom), across each category (depicted in dot lines). It also 
examines the bivariate relationship between leaders’ tenures and the rate of 
mass killing onset per year using nonparametric locally weighted regression 
(lowess) plots, displayed in the black solid line. 
First, the figure shows that mass killing onset rates are highest in country-
years with revolutionary leaders, providing supporting evidence for Hypothesis 
1. Mass killings broke out in country-years with revolutionary leaders at about 
two per 100 country-years, which is greater than a rate of 0.3 and 0.8 per 100 
country-years for leaders who enter power regularly and for nonrevolutionary/
irregular leaders.14 Among the forty-one mass killing onsets between 1955 and 
2004, eighteen (41 percent) were committed by revolutionary leaders that ac-
count for only 13 percent of 6,417 country-years. A very similar picture emerges 
when I considered only statefailure years in the bottom portion of Figure 3, al-
though the overall chance of mass killing onset is substantially greater than 
when using all country-years. 
Another important finding is that the risk of mass killing outbreak for rev-
olutionary leaders is highest in the immediate wake of revolution, but begins 
to rise sharply again after the leader has been six years in office.15 Consistent 
with my theory, this suggests that the association between revolutionary lead-
ers and mass killing onset is not entirely attributable to the political upheaval 
in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, supporting Hypothesis 2. Con-
trarily, the effects of nonrevolutionary leaders’ years in office are not statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level. 
I explored whether these findings hold when controlling for potential con-
founders related to security threats to leaders, political opportunities for mass 
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murder, and preexisting socioeconomic conditions. Table 1 reports the primary 
empirical results in which the base category is leaders that come to power 
through regular means (including both democratic and autocratic ones). It re-
veals that revolutionary leaders are, as expected, more likely to initiate geno-
cide or politicide than nonrevolutionary leaders. Two-tailed tests show that rev-
olutionary leaders are statistically different from irregular nonrevolutionary 
leaders at the 5 percent level, which supports Hypothesis 1. This finding holds 
both without control variables (model 1) and with control variables (model 2). 
The introduction of the baseline controls, including several measures of exist-
ing conflict and political instability, only slightly decreases the magnitude of 
the coefficient on revolutionary leaders without affecting its statistical signif-
icance. I obtained consistent results when I reestimated the model of model 2 
using a rare events logit estimator (model 3). Rare events bias does not appear 
to affect the logit estimates.16 
Figure 3. Years in power and mass killing onset. Lowess plot (solid line) with 95 percent con-
fidence bands (shaded regions). Dashed lines display mean values.  
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I also accounted for time-invariant heterogeneity between countries by em-
ploying a random effects logit model (model 4) and a conditional fixed effects 
logit estimator (model 5). I find the estimates on revolutionary leaders to be 
positive and statistically different from zero. Therefore, the conclusion I draw 
from the pooled logit models is robust in allowing for cross-country heterogene-
ity in the baseline hazard rate. These results show that the estimated effects 
of revolutionary leaders on mass killing onsets are not an artifact of the esti-
mation method. 
In contrast to the example of revolutionary leaders, little evidence suggests 
that nonrevolutionary leaders who entered office through irregular transition 
are more likely than regular leaders to commit mass killing. Their estimated 
coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant and much smaller in mag-
nitude than those of revolutionary leaders. In addition, when I excluded revolu-
tionary leaders from the analysis, the coefficients on irregular nonrevolutionary 
leaders became negative. This result demonstrates the importance of differen-
tiating between revolutions and coups. 
The estimates reported up to this point are based on the full sample. In line 
with Harff (2003) and Colaresi and Carey (2008), models 6 and 7 examine the 
statefailure sample. Even when conditional on episodes of acute political insta-
bility, the relationship between revolutionary leaders and genocide/politicide 
onset is statistically significant. I also reestimated the main models by exclud-
ing democracies (Table A7 of the online Appendix). These estimates are quali-
tatively identical to the estimates, based on the global sample, of Table 1. The 
same is true when I focused on country-years in which the country is ruled by 
a leader who came to power in an irregular fashion (Table A8). Accordingly, the 
results of Table 1 are robust to the choice of sample. 
For ease of interpretation, Figure 4 displays the estimates of the substantive 
effects of revolutionary leaders. I used model 2 of Table 1 to calculate predicted 
probabilities of genocide/politicide outbreak. I adopted the observed value ap-
proach, setting all the other covariates to the values observed for each obser-
vation, and obtained average effects. Revolutionary leaders are more than four 
times as likely to initiate genocide or politcide as nonrevolutionary leaders (1.3 
percent vs. 0.3 percent). This effect is comparable with the effects of important 
situational factors, ongoing civil conflict (producing a 5.6-fold increase from 0.3 
percent to 1.7 percent), and interstate conflict (producing a sixfold increase from 
0.5 percent to 3 percent). When I restrict my analysis to nondemocratic coun-
try-years or irregular leaders, the change from nonrevolutionary to revolution-
ary leaders is associated with about a fivefold or threefold increase in the an-
nual probability of mass killing onset. Lastly, when I use the model from model 
7, based on state-failure years, I found that revolutionary leaders have similar 
effects (2.8 percent vs. 6.8 percent). 
Next, I differentiate subtypes of revolutionary leaders to test Hypotheses 
1a and 1b. Models 1 and 3 of Table 2 substitute two indicators of violent and 
nonviolent revolutionary leaders for revolutionary leaders. The violent revo-
lutionary variable is positive and statistically significant, while the nonvio-
lent revolutionary is not significant although it is also positive. Only violent 
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revolutionary leaders are more likely than nonrevolutionary leaders to com-
mit mass violence, confirming the importance of violent struggles against the 
state in prompting revolutionary leaders’ decision to perpetrate mass kill-
ing. This finding is similar to the findings of Carter, Bernhard, and Palmer 
(2012) that the positive effect of social revolutions on military capacity and 
interstate war outcomes did not extend to the peaceful revolutions that fol-
lowed the collapse of the Soviet Union, although the difference between vi-
olent and nonviolent revolutionary leaders is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
Models 2 and 4 examine whether exclusionary ideologies are critical to the ef-
fects of revolutionary leaders on the risk of mass violence. Consistent with Harff 
(2003), the results show that revolutionary leaders with exclusionary ideologies 
are more likely than revolutionary leaders with no exclusive ideologies and non-
revolutionary leaders to commit mass violence. The difference between the two 
groups of revolutionary leaders is statistically significant (p-values of .026). Con-
sistent with Harff (2003), this indicates the importance of ideology and religion 
in explaining revolutionary leaders’ propensity to use mass violence. 
Revolutionary Leaders versus Revolution and Postrevolutionary Instability 
To test Hypothesis 2, I further investigate whether the temporal pattern found 
in Figure 3 emerges when I take into account several factors related to mass 
killing. To this end, I introduced dummy variables for seven, nonoverlapping, 
five-year periods around the revolution, {R0, … , R6}, to model 2 of Table 1. R0 
is set equal to 1 for the five years before the revolution, the next six dummy 
variables, R1, … , R6, are set equal to 1 in each five years under a revolutionary 
government, and R7 captures the remaining period (greater than or equal to 
thirty). Each dummy equals 0 in all years other than those specified. The base-
line period includes the nonrevolutionary years. 
Figure 5, summarizing the estimation results, shows that the effects of rev-
olutionary leaders do not die out as leaders’ time in office increases.17 Except 
R2 and R6, all postrevolutionary periods are positively correlated with a greater 
risk of mass killing onset. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the first five 
postrevolutionary years R1 is not greater in magnitude than those of these later 
postrevolutionary periods. I found similar results when I used different time 
windows, three-year or ten-year periods (Tables A11 and A12), or when I added 
a binary indicator of revolutions as one-off events, along with a one-year lead 
and lag, to the baseline specification (Table A13). These results strongly dem-
onstrate that the relationships I have found are unlikely to be driven only by 
heightened political instability and tenure insecurity after a revolution. Revo-
lutionary leaders have an impact on the likelihood of mass killing onsets dis-
tinct from revolutions as oneoff events. 
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Supplementary Analyses 
To gain more insight on the mechanisms behind estimates, I conducted sup-
plementary analyses. I examined whether war is a necessary condition for rev-
olutionary leaders’ mass killing. It is known that mass killing occurs during 
wars (Melson 1992; Midlarsky 2011; Straus 2015; Weitz 2003), and some schol-
ars argue that mass killings happen only during periods of intense political up-
heaval. For example, Melson (1992) argues that war is a necessary condition for 
genocide. When domestic groups are linked to the foreign enemy of the regime 
in wartime, their chances of becoming targets of mass killing considerably in-
crease. However, I found no evidence that the effects of revolutionary leaders on 
mass killing outbreaks are conditional on internal and interstate war (Tables 
A15 and A16). The systematic relationship between revolutionary leaders and 
mass killing onsets holds regardless of internal and interstate war’s existence. 
Next, I subjected my results to additional robustness checks. Due to space 
considerations, I briefly discuss the results of these robustness checks and re-
port them in the Online Appendix. First, I used multiple imputation to ensure 
that the results presented above are not dependent on listwise deletion of ob-
servations with missing values. Listwise deletion reduces the number of obser-
vations by 9 percent but substantially decreases the number of mass killing on-
sets from forty-one to thirty-two. If the missing observations on economic and 
political control variables are also correlated with the presence of a revolution-
ary leader, the listwise deletion would bias my estimates.18 Thus, I multiply im-
puted the missing data on the control variables using the Amelia II program 
(Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) and reestimated the models of Tables 1 
Figure 5. Partitioning revolutionary leaders by time periods. Dots display the coefficient es-
timates of different time periods, and horizontal line segments display the 95 percent con-
fidence intervals.      
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and 2 using multiply imputed data. Tables A3 and A4 of online Appendix indi-
cate that the results substantively remain unchanged. 
Second, I repeated my analysis using a matching method that creates a com-
parison group among the control units that is as similar as possible to the set of 
revolutionary leaders. The country-years of revolutionary leaders are likely to 
be very different from the country-years of nonrevolutionary leaders, and the 
estimated effects of revolutionary leaders may depend on the linear extrapola-
tions from the data. To address this concern, I first preprocessed the data using 
the coarsened exact matching method (Iacus, King, and Porro 2012) and then 
reestimated the parametric logit model on the matched data set to control for 
remaining differences between the two groups. I matched on the baseline set of 
control variables used in Table 1. Table A10 shows that the connection between 
Table 2. Exploring the Role of Violence and Ideology.
                                                     All country-years                         State-failure years
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Violent revolutionary  1.74*** (0.48)   1.08** (0.52)
Nonviolent 0.91 (0.74)   0.82 (0.83)
   revolutionary
Revolutionary,  2.01*** (0.53)   1.62*** (0.55)
   exclusive ideology
Revolutionary, no  0.61 (0.51)   0.15 (0.43)
   exclusive ideology
Nonrevolutionary  0.21 (0.58)  0.19 (0.59)  –0.02 (0.57)  –0.00 (0.57)
    and irregular
Civil conflict  1.64*** (0.49)  1.75*** (0.48)  0.40 (0.46)  0.44 (0.48)
Interstate conflict  1.94*** (0.48)  1.87*** (0.51)  1.09** (0.46)  0.98* (0.50)
Polity 2  0.18 (0.12)  0.19 (0.13)  0.15 (0.13)  0.22 (0.15)
Polity 2 (squared)  –0.01* (0.01)  –0.01* (0.01)  –0.02* (0.01)  –0.02** (0.01)
Political instability  1.26*** (0.40)  1.28*** (0.42)  0.51 (0.47)  0.44 (0.52)
ln(GDPpc)  –0.14 (0.32)  –0.16 (0.28)  0.04 (0.29)  –0.02 (0.26)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.12 (0.98)  0.45 (0.88)  0.15 (0.97)  0.27 (0.91)
Post–Cold War  –0.97 (0.65)  –0.79 (0.59)  –1.00* (0.54)  –0.96* (0.54)
Constant  –6.16** (3.11)  –6.31** (2.79)  –4.44 (2.72)  –4.28* (2.47)
Observations  5,814  5,814  816  816
Countries  148  148  87  87
Onsets  32  32  32  32
Log likelihood  –153.84  –151.80  –112.97  –110.14
Regular Leader is the baseline category. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level are in parentheses. GDPpc = gross domestic product per capita.
* p < .1
** p < .05
*** p < .01
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revolutionary leaders and mass killing is robust to the use of matched samples. 
The same is true when I used multiply imputed data. 
Last, I estimated models including additional control variables, a mea-
sure of executive constraints from the Polity IV data, autocratic regime types 
from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), and a measure of oil wealth depen-
dence. I find that revolutionary leaders’ propensity to engage in mass killing 
is not driven by institutional configurations under revolutionary governments 
or an economic factor. I further examined whether the estimates I have re-
ported are sensitive to adding or deleting other control variables. Using the 
program developed by Young and Holsteen (2015), I estimated all possible 
combinations of controls (2,048 models) and store all of the estimates on rev-
olutionary leaders. Figure A1 displays the distribution of all the estimates of 
revolutionary leaders. In every model, the estimated coefficient remains pos-
itive, ranging from 1.1 to 2.3, and statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. This demonstrates that the main results are strongly robust to differ-
ent model specifications. 
Conclusion 
This article argues that leaders emerging from successful revolutionary move-
ments are both more willing to pursue and more capable of pursuing large-scale 
violence against unarmed civilians. My empirical analysis supports my expec-
tations, demonstrating that there are substantial differences in the behavioral 
tendencies of political leaders to initiate mass violence. I find that revolution-
ary leaders are more likely to commit genocide or politicide than nonrevolution-
ary leaders, including those who gain power via irregular means, such as coups, 
assassinations, and civil wars short of revolutions. 
My argument and findings have implications. First, this article challenges 
previous research on revolutions and mass killing, most of which focuses on 
revolutions as events. Consistent with previous research, I find that the risk 
of genocide or politicide is high in the immediate postrevolutionary period 
when regime change occurs. However, I also find that even after their hold on 
power stabilizes, revolutionary leaders are still more likely to commit geno-
cide or politicide. The connection between revolutionary leaders and mass kill-
ing remains consistent even while controlling for several measures of polit-
ical crises. The results suggest that the relationship between revolutionary 
leaders and mass killing is not simply attributable to political upheaval. Be-
sides opening up political opportunities for new leaders to eliminate their po-
litical opponents, revolutions bring to power leaders who are more apt to com-
mit large-scale violence against civilians in order to legitimize and strengthen 
their own power. 
Second, this article provides evidence consistent with the existing empha-
sis on the importance of individual leaders and their ideologies in explain-
ing mass murder (Bellamy 2012; Fein 1993; Harff 2003; Semelin 2013; Straus 
2015; Weitz 2003). Political leaders matter since large-scale, sustained, and 
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systematic violence against civilians, in most cases, requires the engagement 
of national government. Ideologies determine how leaders perceive threats and 
how they define their goals. My analysis confirms that exclusionary ideologies, 
those that ‘‘justify efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories 
of people’’ (Harff 2003), are critical to explaining revolutionary leaders’ propen-
sity to commit mass atrocities against unarmed citizens. 
Third, future work should seek to directly test each hypothesized mechanism 
postulated in this article. As mentioned, exclusionary ideologies play an impor-
tant role in the connection between revolutionary leaders and mass killing. I 
also find weak evidence that leaders of violent revolutions are more likely to 
commit mass killing than leaders of nonviolent revolutions. However, the rela-
tive weight of the causal mechanisms I advance remains subject to further ex-
ploration.19 I still need to determine the degree to which revolutionary leaders’ 
propensity for mass killing is influenced by their particular individual char-
acteristics versus the organizational capacities they usually bring with them. 
Moreover, my findings cannot provide a definite conclusion about the relative 
significance of the ideological ambitions of the revolutionary leaders versus their 
past experience of violence or attitudes toward risk and violence. Although all 
the hypothesized mechanisms can operate simultaneously, it will be important 
to differentiate the relative weight of each mechanism linking revolutionary 
leaders to mass killing. 
Last, future work could identify the conditions under which revolutionary 
leaders are more likely to choose mass killing as a political strategy. Straus 
(2015) argues that scholars have paid little attention to when and why rul-
ing elites would view the perpetration of mass killing as highly costly. The fac-
tors that discourage revolutionary leaders from employing violence should be 
explored, given that most leaders do not choose mass killing. Meanwhile, un-
derstanding why violence escalates is still important to determining the re-
lationship between revolutionary leaders and mass violence. I find little evi-
dence that revolutionary leaders are more likely to choose mass killing when 
they are faced with internal or interstate conflicts. This seems to suggest the 
need to focus on leaders’ perceived threats rather than on material conditions 
in wartime (Straus 2015). Future research could utilize, instead of actual mili-
tarized conflicts, the measure of strategic rivalries, defined as interstate rival-
ries in which states view ‘‘each other as competitors, the source of actual or la-
tent threats that pose some probability of becoming militarized, and enemies’’ 
(Thompson 2001, 560).  
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Notes 
1. Bellamy (2012) calls this ideology ‘‘selective extermination’’ according to which the 
protection of civilian immunity applies only to certain groups of civilians. 
2. Colgan contends that a greater risk tolerance, along with revisionist preferences, 
makes revolutionary leaders more belligerent internationally. 
3. Former rebels who occupy the office of the national executive tend to have had leader-
ship positions in rebel organizations (Horowitz and Stam 2014, 536). They are thus 
more likely to actively select themselves into revolutionary movements rather than 
to be coerced into participation. 
4. Leaders’ attitudes toward violence are significantly shaped by whether they regard vi-
olence as not only efficacious but legitimate, ideologically as discussed above or mor-
ally as argued in Fiske and Rai (2014). 
5. However, I find significant effects of revolutionary leaders on the incidence of mass 
killing as well as its onset (see Supplementary Table A6). 
6. Quite a few studies examining genocide and politicide have used this data set (e.g., An-
derton and Carter 2015; Colaresi and Carey 2008; Harff 2003; Goldsmith et al. 2013). 
7. If a leadership change occurred in the same year but after the mass killing started, I 
categorized the leader type at the start of the mass killing as the same leader type 
from the previous year. 
8. According to Colgan (2012), ‘‘a leader has the same coding for each year that he is con-
tinuously in office. A leader who leaves office and then returns to it later can have a 
different coding’’ (p. 452). 
9. Colgan (2012) measures whether the individual leader ‘‘used armed force against his 
own state at any time prior to coming to office as an integral part of coming to na-
tional influence, and ultimately, state leadership’’ (p. 453). He only considers the use 
of force directly instrumental to the outcome of the transition. The Svolik data set 
codes whether a leader’s entry into office involved violence while the Geddes et al. 
data set measures whether deaths occurred during the actions directly related to the 
overthrow of the government. For my study, I coded the revolutionary process as vi-
olent when either condition was present. 
10. Due to data limitations for some control variables, seventy-six leaders and 748 
countryyears coded as revolutionary leaders are included in the models with con-
trol variables. 
11. The durable variable measures the number of years since the last regime change, de-
fined by a three-point change in the Polity score over a period of three years or less. 
12. A conditional fixed effects logit regression, analyzing only within-country variations, 
drops countries from the analysis that experience no mass killing. This restriction 
26     Nam Kyu Kim in Journal of  Confl ict  Resolut ion  (2016)
on the sample may induce selection bias. Nevertheless, I present the result from the 
conditional logit model for comparison with other estimators. 
13. State failures are defined as all revolutionary wars, ethnic civil wars, adverse regime 
transitions, and genocides or politicides. 
14. The same is true when I excluded democratic leaders. 
15. One may question why a similar temporal pattern in the risk of mass killing onset 
is found for irregular nonrevolutionary leaders when I focus on state-failure years. 
A close examination of the data reveals that this is simply because in the sample 
of state-failure years, there are very few observations of irregular nonrevolution-
ary leaders that stayed long in power. For example, there are only ten observations 
of such leaders after nine years given that there are 221 country-years of irregular 
nonrevolutionary leaders. Meanwhile, two of the eight mass killing onsets, caused 
by irregular nonrevolutionary leaders, occur at the year 10 or 11 while the other six 
occur within the first three years. Taken together, the risk of mass killing outbreak 
significantly rises after five years due to the two onsets of mass killing in ten coun-
try-years. However, the relationship between leader tenure and mass killing risk is 
similar in the full and state-failure samples of revolutionary leaders. In contrast to 
irregular nonrevolutionary cases, there are sixty-eight observations of revolutionary 
leaders (32 percent of the 221 country-years) after nine years and nine of the seven-
teen mass killing onsets occurred between ten and twenty years in power. 
16. Table A4 of online Appendix presents estimates using Firth’s penalized likelihood. 
Results remained similar. 
17. I estimated the Firth’s penalized likelihood method since coefficients on R1, R6, and 
R7 cannot be estimated due to complete separation problem. The use of logit models 
produced similar estimates on other periods. 
18. I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to this important point. 
19. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this. 
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Supporting Appendix
to the paper
Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing
(not for publication)
This document presents the results of statistical models that I conducted but, due to space
constraints, were not able to report in the paper.
• Figure A1 displays the distribution of estimated coefficients on Revolutionary Leader
in 2,048 models that are all possible combinations of control variables. The estimated
coefficient remains positive, ranging from 1.1 to 2.3, and statistically significant at the
5% level.
• Table A1 provides summary statistics on variables used in the analysis.
• Table A2 examines the bivariate relationship between revolutionary leaders and mass
killing onsets or incidence. The patterns shown in Table A2 support the finding
illustrated in Figure ?? of the main text. More mass killings have occurred under
revolutionary governments than under non-revolutionary governments.
• Tables A3 and A4 re-estimate Tables 1 and 2 in the main text using a multiply imputed
dataset that includes all mass killing onsets from 1955 to 2004.
• Table A5 implements the Firth’s penalized likelihood method to reduce rare events bias.
Results remain similar.
• Table A6 examines the incidence of genocide and politicide rather than the onset of
genocide and politicide. Revolutionary leaders are associated with a greater risk of
mass killing, regardless of whether I look at the onset or incidence of mass killing.
• Tables A7 and A8 re-produce the models 1 to 5 of Table ?? with the subsample of
autocratic country-years and with that of country-years having irregular leaders. Table
?? of the main text considers the entire sample of country years or the subsample of
state failure country years. The results of Tables A7 and A8 are consistent with those
reported in Table ??.
• Table A9 presents the balance statistics before and after the coarsened exact matching.
Table A10 estimates the model 2 of Table 1 using matched datasets.
• Table A11 examines whether the effects of revolutionary leaders are driven by political
instability in the aftermath of the revolution. As in Figure ?? in the main text, I add
{R0, . . . , R7} to the baseline model specifications of Table ??. Figure ?? displays only
the results of Model 2 in Table ??. Additionally, Table A12 uses four dummies for
non-overlapping ten-year post-revolutionary periods instead of five-years periods, while
Table A13 uses 10 dummies for three-year post-revolutionary periods. Regardless of how
to split revolutionary leaders into several time periods, results show that the heightened
risk of mass killing does not simply fade away as leaders’ time in office increases.
• Table A14 adds a binary indicator of revolutions as events to the baseline specifi-
cation of Table ??. After the indicator of revolution picks up the effect of political
turmoil in the midst of revolution, the relationship between revolutionary leaders and
genocide/politicide outbreak remains positive and significant.
• Tables A15 and A16 examine whether the effect of revolutionary leaders is conditional on
internal or interstate wars. Table A15 includes an interaction term between revolutionary
leaders and civil conflict, and Table A16 adds an interaction term between revolutionary
leaders and interstate war to the baseline specification. Both interaction terms are not
statistically significant at conventional levels. These results suggest that the effects
of revolutionary leaders on mass killing outbreak are not conditional on internal and
interstate war.
• Tables A17 through A19 control for additional variables. Table A17 adds a measure
of executive constraints, emphasized in Colaresi and Carey (1008), to the baseline
specification of Table ??; Table A18 includes various types of authoritarian regimes
taken from Geddes et al. (2014); and Table A19 adds a measure of oil income, discussed
in Straus (2015). I obtain the measure of executive constraints taken from the Polity IV
data and the measure of oil income from Ross (2012). Ross operationalizes oil income
per capita as the value of a country’s oil and gas production in constant 2000 dollars,
divided by its midyear population, and its natural logarithm is used for my analyses
since it is highly skewed. Across different specifications, the estimated coefficients of
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Figure A1. Distribution of estimates on revolutionary leaders. This
figure depicts the distribution of the estimates on revolutionary leaders
from 2,048 models that are unique combinations of 11 control variables.
Vertical line indicates the estimate of Revolutionary leaders as reported
in Model 2 of Table 1.
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Table A1. Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
Revolutionary Leader 5814 .13 .33 0 1 0
Non-revolutionary&Irregular 5814 .16 .37 0 1 0
Violent revolutionary 5814 .07 .25 0 1 0
Non-violent revolutionary 5814 .06 .24 0 1 0
Seeking ideology/religion changes 5805 .04 .19 0 1 0
Seeking no changes 5805 .87 .33 0 1 1
Civil Conflict 5814 .13 .34 0 1 0
Interstate Conflict 5814 .02 .13 0 1 0
Polity 2 5814 9.91 7.54 0 20 8
Political Instability 5814 .18 .38 0 1 0
ln(GDPpc) 5814 7.96 1.05 5.33 10.34 7.95
Ethnic Fractionalization 5814 .46 .27 0 .95 .49
Post-Cold War 5814 .33 .47 0 1 0
ln(Oil Income) 5578 2.39 2.84 0 11.22 .85
Executive constraints 5814 1.27 15.14 -88 7 3
State Failure 5814 .14 .35 0 1 0
Peace years 5814 24.44 14.35 0 49 24
Peace years 2 5814 803.17 731.95 0 2401 576
Peace years 3 5814 29796.97 34365.77 0 117649 13824
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Table A2. Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing
Mass killing onset
Non-revolutionary Revolutionary Total
0 5,670 822 6,492
(99.6%) (98.0%) (99.4%)
1 24 17 41
(0.4%) (2.0%) (0.6%)
Total 5,694 839 6,533
Mass killing incidence
Non-revolutionary Revolutionary Total
0 5,670 822 6,492
(97.2%) (88.7%) (96.0%)
1 162 105 267
(2.8%) (11.3%) (4.0%)
Total 5,832 927 6,759
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Table A3. Reestimating Table 1 using multiply imputed data
All country-years State failure years
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit Logit Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.41*** 1.22*** 1.20*** 1.41*** 1.76** 1.04*** 0.78*
(0.34) (0.43) (0.43) (0.48) (0.87) (0.36) (0.45)
Nonrevolutionary & Irregular 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.07 0.18 -0.06
(0.53) (0.53) (0.56) (0.91) (0.45) (0.51)
Civil Conflict 1.59*** 1.57*** 1.84*** 1.50** 0.34
(0.42) (0.42) (0.47) (0.70) (0.43)
Interstate conflict 1.76*** 1.86*** 1.63** 0.86 1.28***
(0.56) (0.56) (0.73) (0.90) (0.45)
Polity 2 0.24** 0.21* 0.25 0.09 0.22*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.27) (0.12)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.02** -0.01** -0.02* -0.01 -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Political Instability 1.33*** 1.31*** 1.52*** 2.63*** 0.63
(0.35) (0.35) (0.45) (0.70) (0.44)
ln(GDPpc) -0.11 -0.11 -0.22 -0.44 -0.00
(0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.80) (0.26)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.37 0.36 0.37 3.87 0.25
(0.87) (0.87) (0.92) (32.26) (0.87)
Post-Cold War -0.95 -0.87 -1.49** -4.37*** -1.11**
(0.59) (0.59) (0.71) (1.13) (0.52)
Constant -4.99***-6.66** -6.42** -7.46*** -3.81 -4.35*
(0.56) (2.71) (2.71) (2.61) (0.28) (2.42)
Observations 6417 6266 6266 6266 964 929 901
Countries 162 162 162 162 162 162 162
Onsets 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
Note: Regular leader is the baseline category. Model 3 estimates the rare-events logit model, Model
4 a random effects logit model, and Model 5 a conditional logit fixed effects model; all other models
employ a logit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses
(except in Models 4 and 5). A cubic polynomial of years since the last mass killing (Models 1 through
5) or state failure years (Models 6 and 7) is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A4. Reestimating Table 2 using multiply imputed data
All country-years State failure years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violent revolutionary 1.58*** 0.88*
(0.45) (0.48)
Nonviolent revolutionary 0.58 0.55
(0.73) (0.81)
Revolutionary, Exclusive Ideology 1.87*** 1.42***
(0.49) (0.52)
Revolutionary, No Exclusive Ideology 0.31 -0.09
(0.53) (0.46)
Nonrevolutionary & Irregular 0.12 0.11 -0.06 -0.05
(0.53) (0.54) (0.51) (0.52)
Civil Conflict 1.46*** 1.60*** 0.32 0.36
(0.45) (0.43) (0.43) (0.44)
Interstate conflict 1.75*** 1.70*** 1.25*** 1.16**
(0.52) (0.55) (0.45) (0.50)
Polity 2 0.26** 0.27** 0.22* 0.27*
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Political Instability 1.37*** 1.42*** 0.67 0.67
(0.36) (0.38) (0.46) (0.51)
ln(GDPpc) -0.17 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09
(0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.10 0.45 0.16 0.32
(0.95) (0.86) (0.94) (0.89)
Post-Cold War -1.03 -0.94* -1.10** -1.11**
(0.64) (0.56) (0.52) (0.51)
Constant -6.10** -6.34** -4.23* -4.00*
(2.88) (2.60) (2.45) (2.26)
Observations 6266 6266 901 901
Countries 162 162 162 162
Onsets 41 41 41 41
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses;
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no
mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save
space.
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Table A5. Penalized maximum likelihood logit estimates.
All country-years State failure years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revolutionary Leader 1.59*** 1.42*** 1.24*** 0.95**
(0.35) (0.43) (0.36) (0.43)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.69 0.27 0.43 0.03
(0.42) (0.53) (0.43) (0.53)
Civil Conflict 1.71*** 0.40
(0.41) (0.45)
Interstate Conflict 2.04*** 1.16
(0.63) (0.72)
Polity 2 0.14 0.12
(0.15) (0.16)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)




Ethnic Fractionalization 0.35 0.20
(0.71) (0.77)
Post-Cold War -0.79 -0.90*
(0.57) (0.51)
Constant -5.12*** -6.39*** -4.36*** -4.26*
(0.53) (2.24) (0.31) (2.23)
Observations 6417 5814 6417 816
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of
years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but
not reported to save space.
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Table A6. Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing Incidence
All country-years State failure years
Rare RE FE
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit Logit Logit
Revolutionary Leader 0.91*** 1.17*** 1.15*** 1.21*** 0.92* 0.86** 0.91**
(0.32) (0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.51) (0.35) (0.43)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.49* 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.27 0.34 0.12
(0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39) (0.49) (0.31) (0.33)
Lagged incidence 6.52*** 6.34*** 6.10*** 6.32*** 5.94*** 6.12*** 6.17***
(0.54) (0.75) (0.74) (0.79) (0.92) (0.34) (0.45)
Civil Conflict 1.53*** 1.52*** 1.59*** 1.20*** 0.54
(0.32) (0.31) (0.34) (0.42) (0.39)
Interstate Conflict 1.25** 1.30** 1.26* 0.87 0.76*
(0.63) (0.63) (0.68) (0.66) (0.45)
Polity 2 0.23** 0.22** 0.24* 0.11 0.08
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Political Instability 0.72** 0.70** 0.76** 0.97*** 0.43
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.38)
ln(GDPpc) -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 0.26 0.25
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.59) (0.24)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.61 0.59 0.60 57.41 1.11
(0.51) (0.51) (0.63) (2833.67) (0.74)
Post-Cold War -1.64*** -1.60*** -1.79*** -2.31*** -1.75***
(0.36) (0.35) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44)
Constant -5.12*** -6.08*** -5.88*** -6.58*** -3.84*** -6.26***
(0.57) (1.95) (1.95) (1.91) (0.23) (2.21)
Observations 6673 6016 6016 6016 1049 1171 1029
Countries 163 150 150 150 24 98 90
Onsets 267 229 229 229 226 267 229
Log-Likelihood -328.60 -242.29 -241.87 -142.58 -207.61 -156.64
Note: Column 4 estimates a random effects logit model; Column 5 estimates a conditional logit fixed
effects model; all other models use a logit model. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level
are in parentheses (except in Columns 4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of
years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A7. Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing Onset For Autocratic Country-years
Autocratic country years
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.46*** 1.60*** 1.51*** 2.18*** 4.64**
(0.46) (0.43) (0.42) (0.77) (1.86)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.52 0.30 0.31 0.46 4.13**
(0.54) (0.62) (0.61) (0.82) (1.80)
Civil Conflict 2.20*** 2.15*** 2.67*** 2.43**
(0.65) (0.65) (0.69) (1.10)
Interstate Conflict 2.15*** 2.21*** 2.22*** 2.35*
(0.47) (0.47) (0.84) (1.21)
Polity 2 0.43** 0.38* 0.43 0.57
(0.21) (0.21) (0.26) (0.41)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 0.84 0.87 1.21* 5.38***
(0.58) (0.58) (0.67) (1.68)
ln(GDPpc) -0.08 -0.06 -0.19 -2.69*
(0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (1.55)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.55 0.49 0.65 10.90
(1.20) (1.19) (1.25) (9355.46)
Post-Cold War -0.36 -0.24 -0.45 -3.04*
(0.78) (0.77) (0.91) (1.56)
Constant -6.19*** -8.80** -8.31** -11.34***
(0.74) (3.88) (3.86) (4.02)
Observations 2860 2562 2562 2562 404
Countries 114 104 104 104 17
Onsets 28 24 24 24 24
Log-Likelihood -146.66 -104.09 -102.29 -29.06
Note: Column 4 estimates the rare-events logit model; Column 5 estimates a ran-
dom effects logit model; Column 6 estimates a conditional logit fixed effects model;
all other models use a logit model. Robust standard errors clustered at the country
level are in parentheses (except in Columns 4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all
models but not reported to save space.
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Table A8. Revolutionary Leaders and Mass Killing Onset For Irregular Leaders
Irregular country years
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 0.98** 1.25** 1.16** 1.73** 3.89**
(0.44) (0.55) (0.54) (0.74) (1.89)
Civil Conflict 1.77*** 1.73*** 2.13*** 4.15**
(0.59) (0.59) (0.70) (1.67)
Interstate Conflict 1.65*** 1.76*** 1.57 1.24
(0.50) (0.49) (0.99) (1.48)
Polity 2 -0.13 -0.20 -0.20 0.21
(0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.44)
Polity 2 (squared) 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Political Instability 1.25*** 1.23*** 1.58** 8.24***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.62) (2.88)
ln(GDPpc) 0.04 0.04 -0.13 7.28**
(0.40) (0.40) (0.45) (3.12)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.82 0.77 1.04 4.51
(1.22) (1.21) (1.33) (8982.46)
Post-Cold War -1.04 -0.90 -1.57 -4.74**
(0.85) (0.85) (0.98) (1.93)
Constant -5.57*** -7.55* -6.98* -9.02**
(0.87) (4.12) (4.09) (3.92)
Observations 1903 1681 1681 1681 380
Countries 96 85 85 85 18
Onsets 25 22 22 22 22
Log-Likelihood -126.15 -98.44 -97.59 -21.78
Note: Column 3 estimates the rare-events logit model; Column 4 estimates
a random effects logit model; Column 5 estimates a conditional logit fixed
effects model; all other models use a logit model. Robust standard errors
clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except in Columns 4); * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass
killing for each country is included in all models but not reported to save
space.
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Table A9. Imbalance Statistics
Before matching After CEM
Variable L1 distance Diff-in-Means L1 distance Diff-in-Means
Civil Conflict 0.04 0.04 4.1 · 10−15 1.1 · 10−15
Interstate Conflict 0.02 0.02 1.4 · 10−15 1.5 · 10−15
Polity 2 0.44 -6.12 0.22 0.04
Polity 2 (squared) 0.41 -136.87 0.07 -5.47
Political Instability 0.06 0.06 4.8 · 10−15 1.9 · 10−15
ln(GDPpc) 0.36 -0.78 0.11 -0.01
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.22 0.06 0.15 0.01
Post-Cold War 0.07 -0.07 5.5 · 10−15 1.4 · 10−15
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Table A10. On Matched Sample
Listwise deletion Multiple imputation
(1) (2)




Civil Conflict 1.93* 1.66***
(1.02) (0.63)
Interstate conflict 1.38 1.61
(1.12) (1.03)
Polity 2 -0.06 0.02
(0.38) (0.30)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.02)




Ethnic Fractionalization 1.29 1.62
(1.30) (1.34)






Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in
parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial
of years with no mass killing for each country is included in all models
but not reported to save space.
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Table A11. Dividing Revolutionary Leaders by Time Period
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
5 years before revolution 1.03** 0.66 0.71 0.81 0.87
(0.40) (0.48) (0.48) (0.59) (1.00)
First 5 revolutionary years 1.93*** 1.44*** 1.42*** 1.71*** 2.74**
(0.44) (0.51) (0.48) (0.61) (1.12)
Second 5 revolutionary years 0.16 0.38 0.56 -1.43
(1.13) (1.19) (1.13) (3.10)
Third 5 revolutionary years 1.90*** 2.09*** 2.09*** 2.39*** 2.94**
(0.60) (0.74) (0.72) (0.74) (1.18)
Fourth 5 revolutionary years 2.15*** 1.77** 1.88** 2.07** 2.22
(0.64) (0.88) (0.88) (0.94) (1.57)
Fifth 5 revolutionary years 1.55 2.51** 2.82*** 2.92** 4.03**
(1.12) (1.09) (1.08) (1.27) (1.83)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.62 0.19 0.22 0.11 0.49
(0.44) (0.59) (0.57) (0.60) (0.91)
Civil Conflict 1.65*** 1.62*** 1.83*** 1.69**
(0.51) (0.50) (0.49) (0.74)
Interstate Conflict 1.91*** 1.99*** 1.87** 1.25
(0.50) (0.50) (0.76) (1.00)
Polity 2 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.29)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 1.33*** 1.30*** 1.51*** 2.38***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.51) (0.74)
ln(GDPpc) -0.06 -0.06 -0.19 -0.40
(0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.92)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.32 0.32 0.35 39.22
(0.90) (0.90) (0.94) (8612.27)
Post-Cold War -0.69 -0.62 -1.09 -3.37***
(0.59) (0.58) (0.72) (1.13)
Sixth 5 revolutionary years -0.04
(3682.41)
30 or greater revolutionary years -11.08
(2802.38)
Constant -5.35*** -6.89** -6.55** -7.41***
(0.65) (2.99) (2.87) (2.75)
Observations 6331 5729 5814 5729 851
Countries 162 148 148 148 24
Onsets 41 32 32 32 32
Log-Likelihood -222.21 -151.60 -150.40 -55.52
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses (except
in Columns 4); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The full set of baseline controls is
included in all models but not reported to save space. Several periods are dropped in
Columns 1 to 3, because they perfectly predict the absence of mass killing.14
Table A12. Using Ten-year Periods
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
First 10 revolutionary years 1.50*** 1.17** 1.17** 1.37** 1.74*
(0.45) (0.53) (0.52) (0.57) (0.93)
Second 10 revolutionary years 1.99*** 2.02*** 2.01*** 2.25*** 2.55**
(0.48) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (1.05)
Third 10 revolutionary years 1.04 1.84* 2.23** 2.10* 3.25**
(1.02) (1.07) (1.07) (1.22) (1.58)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.66 0.20 0.25 0.11 0.39
(0.43) (0.58) (0.58) (0.59) (0.93)
Civil Conflict 1.73*** 1.71*** 1.90*** 1.66**
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.73)
Interstate Conflict 1.82*** 1.90*** 1.77** 0.89
(0.52) (0.52) (0.75) (0.95)
Polity 2 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.14
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 1.40*** 1.37*** 1.55*** 2.52***
(0.45) (0.44) (0.49) (0.75)
ln(GDPpc) -0.10 -0.09 -0.22 -0.31
(0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.89)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.33 0.32 0.35 33.56
(0.90) (0.90) (0.91) (8683.58)
Post-Cold War -0.90 -0.82 -1.38* -4.02***
(0.61) (0.61) (0.74) (1.08)
Fourth 10 revolutionary years -12.62
(5617.43)
Constant -5.21*** -6.60** -6.35** -7.06***
(0.62) (3.03) (3.02) (2.67)
Observations 6371 5768 5814 5768 851
Countries 162 148 148 148 24
Onsets 41 32 32 32 32
Log-Likelihood -227.08 -153.58 -152.60 -58.76
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing
for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A13. Using Three-year Periods
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
3 years before revolution 1.04** 0.50 0.64 0.56 -0.01
(0.53) (0.55) (0.55) (0.71) (1.06)
1st 3 revolutionary years 2.39*** 1.77*** 1.89*** 2.03*** 2.64**
(0.44) (0.51) (0.49) (0.62) (1.13)
4th 3 revolutionary years 1.44* 1.67* 1.98** 1.88** 1.16
(0.85) (0.89) (0.88) (0.88) (1.36)
5th 3 revolutionary years 2.29*** 2.40*** 2.60*** 2.70*** 3.20**
(0.72) (0.87) (0.86) (0.82) (1.43)
6th 3 revolutionary years 2.02*** 1.44 1.97* 1.72 2.20
(0.75) (1.15) (1.14) (1.16) (1.56)
7th 3 revolutionary years 2.70*** 2.78*** 3.00*** 3.07*** 3.31*
(0.78) (0.81) (0.81) (1.02) (1.76)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.63 0.21 0.39 0.12 0.38
(0.44) (0.58) (0.57) (0.59) (0.91)
Civil Conflict 1.67*** 1.62*** 1.87*** 1.79**
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.74)
Interstate Conflict 1.70*** 1.76*** 1.68** 0.90
(0.51) (0.52) (0.80) (1.02)
Polity 2 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.10
(0.12) (0.13) (0.18) (0.29)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 1.20*** 1.19*** 1.37*** 2.35***
(0.46) (0.46) (0.52) (0.79)
ln(GDPpc) -0.10 -0.08 -0.22 -0.22
(0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.88)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.23 0.26 0.29 47.72
(0.90) (0.91) (0.93) (17665.58)
Post-Cold War -0.77 -0.72 -1.19 -3.84***
(0.59) (0.59) (0.74) (1.15)
2nd 3 revolutionary years -13.73
(1878.73)
3rd 3 revolutionary years -14.04
(1860.92)
8th 3 revolutionary years -13.87
(9753.95)
9th 3 revolutionary years -13.66
(8121.67)
30 or greater revolutionary years -12.79
(5817.30)
Constant -5.29*** -6.40** -6.44** -6.86**
(0.64) (2.85) (2.83) (2.72)
Observations 6065 5503 5814 5503 851
Countries
Onsets
Log-Likelihood -215.91 -146.73 -145.56 -53.63
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing for each
country is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A14. Adding Revolution as One-off Event
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.73*** 1.26** 1.24** 1.46*** 1.72*
(0.51) (0.52) (0.52) (0.56) (0.96)
Revolution 1.72*** 1.34* 1.38** 1.43** 1.28
(0.60) (0.70) (0.70) (0.72) (0.90)
Revolution (t-1) 1.01 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.41
(0.83) (0.95) (0.95) (0.89) (1.08)
Revolution (t+1) 2.41*** 1.80*** 1.87*** 1.93*** 1.45
(0.57) (0.62) (0.62) (0.73) (0.96)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.81 0.21 0.26 0.15 0.42
(0.54) (0.59) (0.59) (0.59) (0.89)
Civil Conflict 1.74*** 1.70*** 1.97*** 1.56**
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.68)
Interstate Conflict 2.05*** 2.13*** 2.04*** 1.17
(0.55) (0.55) (0.74) (0.94)
Polity 2 0.19* 0.17 0.18 0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.27)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01** -0.01* -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Political Instability 1.02** 1.01** 1.21** 2.14***
(0.40) (0.40) (0.49) (0.75)
ln(GDPpc) -0.06 -0.06 -0.18 -0.41
(0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.93)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.40 0.39 0.41 26.83
(0.93) (0.92) (0.92) (13791.88)
Post-Cold War -0.78 -0.71 -1.15 -3.45***
(0.65) (0.65) (0.71) (1.11)
Constant -5.92*** -6.85** -6.59** -7.37***
(0.67) (2.89) (2.88) (2.70)
Observations 5668 5668 5668 5668 830
Countries 148 148 148 148 24
Onsets 32 32 32 32 32
Log-Likelihood -170.26 -150.46 -149.29 -57.48
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing
for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A15. Interacting Revolutionary Leaders with Civil Conflict
Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.78*** 1.71*** 1.86*** 1.85**
(0.55) (0.55) (0.60) (0.90)
Civil Conflict 2.07*** 2.02*** 2.12*** 1.23
(0.59) (0.58) (0.59) (0.81)
Revolutionary leader× Conflict -0.73 -0.66 -0.57 0.69
(0.76) (0.76) (0.81) (1.14)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.18 0.23 0.11 0.46
(0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.92)
Interstate Conflict 1.93*** 2.02*** 1.88** 0.92
(0.50) (0.50) (0.73) (0.91)
Polity 2 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.27)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Political Instability 1.22*** 1.20*** 1.38*** 2.51***
(0.41) (0.41) (0.47) (0.74)
ln(GDPpc) -0.09 -0.08 -0.20 -0.46
(0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.87)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.40 0.40 0.39 29.34
(0.86) (0.86) (0.89) (12276.89)
Post-Cold War -0.82 -0.75 -1.27* -3.88***
(0.60) (0.60) (0.73) (1.08)
Constant -6.74** -6.47** -7.10***
(2.94) (2.93) (2.62)
Observations 5814 5814 5814 851
Log-Likelihood -154.31 -153.59 -59.44
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses
(except in Columns 3); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The full set of
baseline controls is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A16. Interacting Revolutionary Leaders with Interstate Conflict
Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.39*** 1.37*** 1.58*** 1.90**
(0.46) (0.46) (0.52) (0.90)
Interstate Conflict 1.62 2.05** 1.52 0.55
(1.05) (1.04) (1.13) (1.28)
Revolutionary Leader× Conflict 0.58 0.26 0.67 0.66
(1.23) (1.22) (1.40) (1.54)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.22 0.26 0.12 0.38
(0.58) (0.58) (0.59) (0.92)
Civil Conflict 1.72*** 1.70*** 1.88*** 1.52**
(0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.69)
Polity 2 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.10
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 1.22*** 1.20*** 1.38*** 2.40***
(0.40) (0.40) (0.47) (0.75)
ln(GDPpc) -0.09 -0.09 -0.21 -0.37
(0.30) (0.29) (0.31) (0.87)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.36 0.35 0.37 25.85
(0.89) (0.89) (0.91) (5399.07)
Post-Cold War -0.85 -0.78 -1.31* -3.89***
(0.62) (0.61) (0.72) (1.08)
Constant -6.54** -6.30** -7.02***
(2.99) (2.98) (2.65)
Observations 5814 5814 5814 851
Log-Likelihood -154.69 -153.72 -59.52
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses
(except in Columns 3); * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The full set of
baseline controls is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A17. Controlling for Executive Constraints
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.84*** 1.54*** 1.49*** 2.09*** 4.84***
(0.47) (0.51) (0.50) (0.76) (1.76)
Executive constraints -0.17** -0.22 -0.20 -0.29 -1.62*
(0.09) (0.22) (0.22) (0.34) (0.86)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.90* 0.48 0.50 0.46 3.52**
(0.49) (0.56) (0.55) (0.72) (1.49)
Civil Conflict 1.94*** 1.91*** 2.31*** 2.04**
(0.51) (0.50) (0.61) (0.99)
Interstate Conflict 2.14*** 2.22*** 2.20*** 3.03**
(0.49) (0.48) (0.82) (1.29)
Polity 2 0.21 0.19 0.25 1.09**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.52)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 1.10*** 1.08** 1.55*** 4.46***
(0.42) (0.42) (0.58) (1.31)
ln(GDPpc) -0.20 -0.19 -0.49 -1.55
(0.35) (0.35) (0.47) (1.62)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.52 0.49 0.82 -6.11
(0.92) (0.91) (1.30) (6851.76)
Post-Cold War -0.96 -0.86 -1.66* -5.85***
(0.74) (0.74) (0.89) (1.77)
Constant -6.06*** -6.42* -6.14* -7.83**
(0.83) (3.37) (3.36) (3.64)
Observations 6079 5638 5638 5638 695
Countries 161 148 148 148 21
Onsets 30 27 27 27 27
Log-Likelihood -167.22 -131.01 -129.51 -34.30
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing
for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A18. Controlling for Geddes’s Authoritarian Regime Types
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.14** 1.26*** 1.22*** 1.50*** 1.79*
(0.47) (0.44) (0.44) (0.55) (1.02)
Party-based Autocracy 0.77 1.25 1.06 1.34 0.99
(0.61) (1.02) (1.01) (0.91) (1.37)
Personalist Autocracy 1.00 1.08 0.91 0.97 0.34
(0.66) (1.04) (1.04) (0.98) (1.44)
Military Autocracy 0.95 0.97 0.83 0.98 0.23
(0.75) (1.04) (1.04) (0.99) (1.13)
Monarch Autocracy -0.25 0.46 0.72 0.63 0.51
(0.99) (0.90) (0.90) (1.40) (1.91)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.37 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.25
(0.50) (0.61) (0.60) (0.62) (1.00)
Civil Conflict 1.77*** 1.75*** 1.94*** 1.52**
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.71)
Interstate Conflict 1.98*** 2.08*** 1.90*** 0.88
(0.50) (0.50) (0.74) (0.93)
Polity 2 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.07
(0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 1.32*** 1.30*** 1.50*** 2.39***
(0.39) (0.39) (0.48) (0.76)
ln(GDPpc) -0.07 -0.06 -0.19 -0.47
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.91)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.41 0.40 0.48 22.75
(0.85) (0.85) (0.93) (7689.26)
Post-Cold War -0.93 -0.86 -1.37* -3.86***
(0.63) (0.63) (0.73) (1.12)
Constant -5.53*** -7.68** -7.22** -8.25***
(0.84) (3.55) (3.53) (2.89)
Observations 5979 5668 5668 5668 850
Countries 150 144 144 144 24
Onsets 40 32 32 32 32
Log-Likelihood -219.49 -153.25 -152.33 -59.26
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing
for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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Table A19. Controlling for Oil Income
Logit Logit ReLogit RE Logit FE Logit
Revolutionary Leader 1.45*** 1.37*** 1.33*** 1.58*** 2.20**
(0.36) (0.43) (0.43) (0.52) (0.93)
ln(Oil Income) 0.02 0.24*** 0.23*** 0.27** 0.26
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.29)
Non-revolutionary & Irregular 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.35
(0.56) (0.56) (0.59) (0.92)
Civil Conflict 1.65*** 1.62*** 1.83*** 1.47**
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.70)
Interstate Conflict 1.64*** 1.72*** 1.62** 0.85
(0.48) (0.48) (0.73) (0.93)
Polity 2 0.22* 0.19 0.22 0.12
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.28)
Polity 2 (squared) -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Political Instability 1.27*** 1.25*** 1.41*** 2.59***
(0.42) (0.42) (0.49) (0.77)
ln(GDPpc) -0.62* -0.59* -0.76* -0.65
(0.33) (0.33) (0.40) (0.94)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.07 0.07 -0.00 24.06
(0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (6095.43)
Post-Cold War -1.25** -1.15* -1.65** -3.92***
(0.63) (0.63) (0.76) (1.09)
Constant -4.88*** -3.20 -3.02 -3.36
(0.61) (2.94) (2.93) (2.94)
Observations 6062 5578 5578 5578 821
Countries 159 148 148 148 24
Onsets 39 32 32 32 32
Log-Likelihood -216.45 -150.88 -150.27 -59.20
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses; * p
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. A cubic polynomial of years with no mass killing
for each country is included in all models but not reported to save space.
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